We establish a fundamental relationship between the return on the banking sector's assets and each banker's willingness to supply liabilities that facilitate payments and settlement (private money). In particular, we show that the regulation of lending practices is necessary for the optimal provision of private money. In an environment in which bankers cannot commit to their promises, an unregulated banking sector fails to implement an e¢ cient allocation. We show that an intervention that raises the value of the bankers'assets (e.g., by regulating lending practices) will make them willing to o¤er a higher return on their liabilities. In particular, if the return on their assets is made su¢ ciently large, then it is possible to implement an e¢ cient allocation with private money.
INTRODUCTION
The institutions composing the banking system do many things, but one of their main functions is to create liquidity. Among many forms of liquidity creation, banks issue liabilities that can be used to facilitate payments and settlement. This is private money. For example, Gorton (1999) highlights the free banking era as a period in American monetary history in which privately issued monies circulated as competing media of exchange. More contemporarily, it has been argued by many observers of the recent …nancial crisis that repurchase agreements are the private monies of our time (e.g., see Gorton and Metrick, 2010 and the explanations therein). Therefore, a primary concern of monetary economists should be to know whether, putting stability issues aside, a private banking system is capable of creating enough of this kind of liquidity to allow society to achieve an e¢ cient allocation. In other words, can a private banking system provide the socially e¢ cient amount of money?
And if so, what are the characteristics of such a system? Should we leave the job to the invisible hand or should we regulate the banking system? Can narrow banking -whereby the business of lending is separated from the business of deposit-taking -provide the e¢ cient amount of money?
To investigate these questions, we construct a general equilibrium model in which some private agents, referred to as bankers, have the ability to issue liabilities that circulate as a medium of exchange. In our framework, what prevents them from supplying the e¢ cient amount of private money? The answer is simple: Bankers cannot commit to repay their creditors, and the threat of terminating their franchise may not be strong enough to induce them to always redeem their liabilities at par. 1 To ensure that bankers do not overborrow and strategically default on their liabilities, we consider a mechanism that imposes individual debt limits on each banker, as in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) . 2 These individual debt limits constrain the banker's portfolio choices and discipline private money creation. 1 This is very much in the spirit of the hypotheses made in Gu, Mattesini, Monnet, and Wright (forthcoming), Boissay (2011) , Wallace (1999a, 1999b) , and Cavalcanti, Erosa and Temzelides (1999) . 2 Their analysis builds on work by Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota (1996) .
Our contribution to the literature is to show how the degree of competition in bank lending a¤ects the bankers'willingness to create private money. We initially characterize a free-banking regime and show that, in this case, any equilibrium is necessarily ine¢ cient.
As bankers compete for borrowers, the return that each one of them obtains on his assets is relatively low. As a consequence, the return that bankers are willing to pay on their liabilities cannot be too high, as otherwise they would renege on their promises. From a social standpoint, we want them to pay a su¢ ciently high return on their money-like liabilities in order to eliminate the opportunity cost of holding them (the Friedman rule).
Because of the low return on their assets in the absence of intervention, bankers are unwilling to supply the socially e¢ cient amount of private money.
This result indicates that, to achieve e¢ ciency, it is necessary to raise the return on the banking sector's assets. 3 In view of this fact, we characterize an incentive-feasible regulatory framework that allows bankers to extract some surplus from borrowers, raising the return on their assets. As a result, it is possible to induce them to pay a higher return on their money-like liabilities. In particular, we show that it is possible to implement an e¢ cient allocation with private money.
The role of regulation in guaranteeing a high franchise value for banks has been recognized by many experts, and, in this respect, our paper is related to Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) . They consider a model of banks with moral hazard and argue that the best way to ensure a high franchise value is to put a cap on the interest rate paid on deposits.
As they write it, by limiting the degree of competition in the deposit market, a deposit rate control will increase per period pro…ts, raising the bank's franchise value. Their analysis does not consider the role of bank liabilities as a means of payment. While our analysis agrees with the general …nding that a high franchise value is necessary for e¢ ciency, we
show that this value should not originate from the liability side of a bank's balance sheet.
Our paper is clearly related to the large literature on the optimal provision of private liquidity. However, in this literature, the e¤ects of competition in bank lending are usually excluded from the analysis. There are two strands in this literature. The …rst strand focuses on the role of liquidity as a means of payment. Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides (1999) and Wallace (1999a, 1999b ) study private money creation in the context of a random-matching model. Azariadis, Bullard, and Smith (2001) study the welfare properties of a purely private monetary system using an overlapping generations model; Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) propose a theory of inside money based on the possibility of collateralization of part of a debtor's assets; and Monnet (2006) studies the characteristics of the agent that is most able to issue money. 4 The second strand focuses on the role of liquidity as a means of funding investment opportunities. For example, Holmstrom and Tirole (2011) show that a moral hazard problem may limit the ability of …rms to re…nance their ongoing projects when there is aggregate uncertainty.
Other authors have focused exclusively on the study of competition in bank lending without explicitly accounting for the role of bankers as liquidity providers. These include Yanelle (1997) and Winton (1995 Winton ( , 1997 . Our results show that the degree of competition in bank lending crucially in ‡uences the bankers'willingness to supply private money. Thus, it is important to consider the interplay between these two activities.
Another paper related to ours is Hart and Zingales (2011) , who show that an unregulated private banking system creates too much money. They present an environment similar to Gu, Mattesini, Monnet, and Wright (forthcoming), to which our paper also bears a resemblance, where a lack of double coincidence of wants, a lack of commitment, and a limited pledgeability of collateral give rise to an essential role for a medium of exchange. A bank acts as a safe-keeping institution for the collateral and issues receipts that can circulate as a means of payment because the bank is able to commit to pay the bearer of a receipt on demand. Hart and Zingales uncover an interesting externality: A bank that issues more money to its customers increases the price level for other people as well. As a result, too much collateral is stored, and banks create too much money. We depart from their analysis in a fundamental way: While they assume that banks can commit to pay back the bearer of 4 Other papers in this literature include Williamson (1999) , Li (2001 Li ( , 2006 , Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) , Sun (2007) , and Andolfatto and Nosal (2009) . the receipts they have issued, we assume they cannot. This su¢ ces to overturn their result:
We show that a poorly regulated banking system may create too little money.
Empirical work on bank liquidity creation is scant, and the Berger and Bouwman (2009) paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the only one that measures the amount of liquidity created by the banking system. The authors construct a measure of liquidity creation by comparing how liquid the entries on both sides of a bank's balance sheet are. According to this measure, a bank creates more liquidity the more its liabilities are liquid relative to its assets. Among other interesting things, they …nd that banks that create more liquidity are valued more highly by investors, as measured by the market-to-book and the price-earnings ratios.
To be clear, we are not concerned in this paper with the stability of the banking sector.
This is clearly an important issue that also relates to liquidity creation. In particular, the business of liquidity transformation and the risks it entails have been highlighted most forcefully in the seminal paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . Their notion of liquidity is one of immediacy: Bank deposits are useful because they can be redeemed on demand when depositors have an urge to consume. So the banking system is fragile whenever banks cannot ful…ll the demand for immediate redemption. This is the well-known problem of a bank being illiquid but solvent. However, Jacklin (1987) considers a solution to banks' inherent fragility, namely, that banks issue tradeable securities. If depositors have an urge to consume, they can sell these securities instead of running to the bank. This notion of liquidity (namely, the ease with which bank liabilities can be traded) is clearly related to ours.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we present and discuss the model. In Section 4, we characterize e¢ cient allocations. In Section 5, we characterize equilibrium allocations in the case of an unregulated banking system. In Section 6, we introduce regulation and characterize equilibrium allocations in the case of a regulated banking system. Section 7 concludes.
MODEL
Time t = 0; 1; 2; ::: is discrete, and the horizon is in…nite. Each period is divided into two subperiods. There are three physical commodities: good 1, good 2, and a capital good. The capital good can be perfectly stored from the …rst to the second subperiod. It depreciates completely if stored until the following date or if used in the production process. Good 1 can be produced only in the …rst subperiod, and good 2 can be produced only in the second subperiod. If good 1 is not properly stored, it will depreciate completely. There exists a productive technology that allows people to store good 1 from one date to the next. This technology returns 1 > 1 units of good 1 at date t + 1 for each unit invested at date t.
Finally, good 2 cannot be stored and must be immediately consumed.
There are four types of agents, referred to as buyers, sellers, entrepreneurs, and bankers, with a [0; 1] continuum of each type. Buyers, sellers, and bankers are in…nitely lived.
Entrepreneurs live for two periods only. At each date t, a new generation of entrepreneurs is born in the …rst subperiod and lives until the second subperiod of date t + 1.
Buyers and sellers want to consume and are able to produce in the …rst subperiod. Specifically, they have access to a divisible production technology that immediately returns one unit of good 1 for each unit of e¤ort they exert. Only a buyer wants to consume good 2, and only a seller is able to produce it. Such a technology requires k units of capital and n units of e¤ort to produce F (k; n) units of good 2. Assume that F : R 2 + ! R + is twice continuously di¤erentiable, increasing in both arguments, and strictly concave, with F (0; n) = 0 for all n 0 and F (k; 0) = 0 for all k 0. Finally, we assume that only sellers are able to store the capital good from the …rst to the second subperiod.
Entrepreneurs specialize in the production of the capital good. Each entrepreneur is endowed with a nontradable, indivisible investment project at birth. Each project requires the investment of exactly e units of good 1 at date t to produce k units of capital at the beginning of date t + 1, wherek > 0 is a constant. Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity levels . Speci…cally, the function G ( ) describes the distribution of the productivity levels across the population of entrepreneurs. Suppose that 2 [0; ] and that there exists a density function g ( ).
We now explicitly describe preferences. Let x b t 2 R denote a buyer's net consumption in the …rst subperiod, and let q b t 2 R + denote his consumption in the second subperiod. His preferences are represented by
where 2 (0; 1). The function u : R + ! R is twice continuously di¤erentiable, increasing, and strictly concave, with u 0 (0) = 1. Let x s t 2 R denote a seller's net consumption in the …rst subperiod, and let n s t 2 R + denote his e¤ort level in the second subperiod. His preferences are represented by
where c : R + ! R + is twice continuously di¤erentiable, increasing, and convex. Let x t 2 R + denote a banker's consumption in the …rst subperiod. Each banker has preferences represented by
Finally, an entrepreneur born at date t wants to consume only at date t + 1. In particular, each entrepreneur born at date t derives utility x e t+1 if his consumption of good 1 at date t + 1 is x e t+1 2 R + . We assume that buyers and sellers are anonymous, and their trading histories are privately observable. As in Wallace (1999a, 1999b) , the trading histories of bankers are publicly observable. Finally, we assume that only bankers are able to observe the trading history of each entrepreneur. Below we provide more details about the implications of these assumptions.
In the …rst subperiod, all agents interact in a centralized location. Whereas bankers and entrepreneurs never leave the centralized location, all buyers and all sellers move to a di¤erent location during the second subperiod. We assume that buyers and sellers do not overlap in the centralized location. In particular, all buyers arrive at the centralized location …rst and leave the centralized location before all sellers arrive. In the second subperiod, we use competitive pricing to determine the terms of trade in the second location, where buyers and sellers interact.
Finally, note that, because buyers are anonymous and lack any commitment, they cannot credibly use goods invested in the storage technology as a means of payment in the second market. Thus, the storage technology for good 1 corresponds to the concept of illiquid capital in Lagos and Rocheteau (2008 Because a banker has the ability to make his actions publicly observable, he will be able to issue personal liabilities that can circulate as a medium of exchange as long as other people believe he will be willing to redeem them at a future date.
Because bankers also lack commitment, we need to impose some sort of punishment for default to guarantee that they make good on their promises, a necessary condition for their private liabilities to circulate as a medium of exchange. As in Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides (1999), Wallace (1999a, 1999b) , and Gu, Mattesini, Monnet, and Wright (forthcoming), we assume the existence of a mechanism that guarantees that any banker who reneges on his promises is punished. Precisely, any banker who defaults on his liabilities can no longer have his actions publicly observable. Moreover, any assets he holds when he defaults will be seized. This means that a defaulter will lose the ability to …nance his activities through the creation of private money.
In this respect, the availability of public knowledge of the banker's actions is crucial for allowing people to identify the states of the world in which the banker will be willing to 5 An alternative tractable framework that also creates a role for a medium of exchange is the large household model in Shi (1997) .
convert his notes into goods on demand. In the second market, a seller does not trust a buyer's IOU because he knows that the latter cannot be punished in case of default. But a seller may accept a banker's IOU because the banker can be punished if he fails to redeem his IOU. Thus, there will be some states of the world in which the banker will be willing to redeem his notes at par, and everybody knows in which states this will happen. Figure 1 shows how a banker's note will circulate in the economy.
EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS
In this section, we formulate and solve the problem of a social planner who has the ability to enforce all transfers at zero cost. This means that a solution to the planner's problem will give us an unconstrained e¢ cient allocation. We assume that the planner treats entrepreneurs of the same generation equally, so he will assign the same consumption level to each member of a given generation. Given these assumptions, an e¢ cient allocation is obtained in the usual way: Given some minimum utility level U e t assigned to each entrepreneur of generation t, for all generations, and some minimum utility levels U and U s assigned to each banker and each seller at date t = 0, respectively, an e¢ cient allocation maximizes the lifetime utility of each buyer subject to participation and resource constraints.
It should be clear that the planner will fund only the entrepreneurs who are su¢ ciently productive. This means that each entrepreneur whose productivity level is greater than or equal to a speci…c marginal type p t 2 [0; ] will receive e units of good 1 to undertake his project at date t, whereas the types 2 [0; p t ) will not carry out their projects. We refer to the type p t as the marginal entrepreneur. Thus, the planner's problem consists of choosing an allocation n x b t ; x s t ; x t ; x e t ; q t ; n t ; i t ; k t+1 ;
to maximize the lifetime utility of the buyer
subject to the resource constraint for good 1
the resource constraint for good 2
the law of motion for capital accumulation
the entrepreneurs'participation constraints
the banker's participation constraint
and the seller's participation constraint
taking the initial stock k 0 = k p 1 > 0 and the required utility levels U e t 1 1 t=0
, U , and U s as given. Notice that any Pareto optimal allocation solves the problem described above for a particular choice of required utility levels U e t 1 1 t=0
, U , and U s , and that any solution to the problem above is a Pareto optimal allocation.
denote the aggregate amount of capital available at the beginning of date t + 1 as a function of the date-t marginal entrepreneur p t . The …rst-order conditions are given by
for all t 0. To marginally increase each buyer's consumption at date t + 1 without changing the e¤ort level that each seller exerts at date t + 1, the planner needs to give up e units of good 1 at date t at the margin to increase the amount of capital available for production at date t + 1. The left-hand side in (8) gives the marginal bene…t of an extra unit of capital at date t + 1, whereas the right-hand side gives the marginal resource cost at date t. Similarly, to marginally increase each buyer's consumption at date t given a predetermined amount of capital, the planner needs to instruct each seller to exert more e¤ort in the second subperiod. Condition (9) guarantees that the marginal disutility of e¤ort equals the marginal bene…t of consuming an extra unit of good 2.
A stationary solution to the planner's problem involves p t = and n t = n for all t 0, with and n satisfying
We also need the initial amount of capital to be equal to k ( ). In the Appendix, we show the existence and uniqueness of a stationary solution to the planner's problem for at least some speci…cations of preferences and technologies.
FREE BANKING
In this section, we describe the equilibrium outcome of an economy without intervention in lending practices. Throughout the paper, we make the assumption that only bankers have the ability to collect a repayment from an entrepreneur. Thus, only bankers will be able to make loans to entrepreneurs to …nance capital formation. 6 To …nance his investments at date t, a banker raises funds by selling notes to buyers.
Then, he uses the proceeds from the sale of notes to supply funds to entrepreneurs or to invest in the storage technology, or both. At date t + 1, he collects the proceeds from his investments and repays his creditors, consuming or reinvesting the remaining pro…ts. A note issued by a banker at date t gives him t units of good 1 and is a promise to repay one unit of good 1 at date t + 1 to the note holder. Each banker has a technology that allows him to create perfectly divisible notes at zero cost. Notes issued by one banker are perfectly distinguishable from those issued by any other banker so that counterfeiting is not a problem.
Throughout the paper, we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria in which all notes trade at the same price. This means that the notes issued by any pair of bankers are perfect substitutes (as long as people believe both bankers will be willing to redeem them at par).
Every agent in the economy takes the sequence of prices f t g 1 t=0 as given when making his individual decisions. 7 The goal of this section is to characterize equilibrium allocations in the absence of intervention. Because bankers cannot commit to repay creditors, we need to assume the existence of a regulator whose exclusive role will be to punish those who default on their liabilities. As in Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000), the regulator has access to each banker's balance sheet and can punish any banker who reneges on his promises by revoking his "franchise" and garnishing his assets.
Bank Loans
In the …rst subperiod, bankers compete for borrowers (entrepreneurs). Let R t ( ) denote the gross interest rate that prevails in the submarket for loans to type-entrepreneurs.
Due to perfect competition among bankers, the return on any bank loan must be equal to 7 We assume that the Walrasian auctioneer takes into account the demand for notes (and the demand for capital) in both rounds of interaction during the …rst subperiod: when all buyers, all bankers, and all entrepreneurs initially interact in the centralized location and, subsequently, when all sellers, all bankers, and all entrepreneurs interact. the return to storage so that the entrepreneurs will capture all surplus from trade. In the absence of intervention, the equilibrium interest rate must be 
will …nd it optimal to borrow at date t. Thus, given t+1 , we can de…ne the marginal entrepreneur m t as the type satisfying
This means that any entrepreneur indexed by 2 [0; m t ] will …nd it optimal to borrow to fund his project, whereas the types 2 [ m t ; ] will choose not to fund their projects. Thus, the aggregate loan amount is given bỳ
In this case, the aggregate amount of capital available for production at date t + 1 will be given by
Buyer' s Problem
Let w b t (a) denote the value function for a buyer who enters the …rst subperiod holding a 2 R + notes, and let v b t (k; a) denote the value function for a buyer who enters the second subperiod holding k 2 R + units of capital and a 2 R + notes. The Bellman equation for a buyer in the …rst subperiod is given by
subject to the budget constraint
Here k 0 denotes the amount of capital the buyer accumulates at the end of the …rst subperiod, and a 0 denotes his choice of note holdings at the end of the …rst subperiod. Note that the value w b t (a) is an a¢ ne function of the form w b t (a) = a + w b t (0), with the intercept w b t (0) given by
Let p t+1 denote the price of one unit of good 2 at date t in terms of good 1 at date t + 1.
The Bellman equation for a buyer holding k 0 units of capital and a 0 notes at the beginning of the second subperiod is given by
subject to the liquidity constraint
This liquidity constraint arises due to the fact that only bankers'liabilities can be used as a medium of exchange.
Using the fact that w b t (a) is an a¢ ne function, we can rewrite the Bellman equation (17) as follows:
Notice that there is no bene…t of accumulating capital (it fully depreciates if not properly stored). Therefore, the buyer optimally chooses k 0 = 0.
The liquidity constraint (18) may either bind or not, depending on the buyer's note holdings. In particular, notice that
If the liquidity constraint does not bind, then the marginal utility of an extra note equals , which is simply the discounted value of the payo¤ of one unit of good 1 at date t + 1. If the liquidity constraint binds, then the marginal utility of an extra note is greater than . In this case, the notes o¤er a liquidity premium. Since the buyer can use the storage technology, he will hold notes if and only if he obtains a liquidity premium or the return on notes is greater than the return to storage.
The …rst-order condition for the optimal choice of note holdings on the right-hand side of (16) is given by
with equality if a 0 > 0. If t > , then the optimal choice of note holdings will be given by
so that notes o¤er a liquidity premium. Because of quasi-linear preferences, all buyers choose to hold the same quantity of notes at the end of the …rst market. Thus, condition (19) gives the aggregate demand for notes as a function of the relative price of good 2 p t+1 and the price of notes t . A higher price for notes reduces the amount of notes demanded.
The e¤ect of the relative price p t+1 on the demand for notes depends on the curvature of the utility function u (q). If [u 00 (q) q] =u 0 (q) < 1, then an increase in p t+1 reduces the demand for notes, holding t constant. If [u 00 (q) q] =u 0 (q) > 1, then an increase in p t+1 results in a higher demand for notes.
Seller' s Problem
Here k 0 denotes the amount of capital the seller accumulates at the end of the …rst subperiod, and a 0 denotes his choice of note holdings at the end of the …rst subperiod. Similarly, the value w s t (a) is an a¢ ne function, w s t (a) = a + w s t (0), with the intercept w s t (0) given by
The Bellman equation for a seller holding k 0 units of capital and a 0 notes at the beginning of the second subperiod is given by
Using the fact that w s t (a) is an a¢ ne function, we can rewrite the right-hand side of (21) as follows:
The …rst-order condition for the optimal choice of e¤ort in the second subperiod is given by
Because (@v s t =@k) (k 0 ; a 0 ) = p t+1 F k (k 0 ; n), the …rst-order condition for the optimal choice of capital on the right-hand side of (20) is given by Thus, conditions (22) and (23) determine the demand for capital and the e¤ort decision as a function of the relative price of the good 2 p t+1 and the relative price of capital t .
Combining (22) with (23), we obtain the following condition:
Finally, the …rst-order condition for the optimal choice of note holdings is given by
with equality if a 0 > 0. This means that the seller does not hold notes if t > .
Banker' s Problem
Now we describe the decision problem of a banker. Let w t (b t 1 ; i t 1 ) denote the value function for a banker with debt b t 1 and assets i t 1 at the beginning of date t. The banker's assets at the beginning of date t consist of loans made at date t 1 and the amount invested in the storage technology at date t 1, whereas the banker's debt refers to the amount of notes issued at date t 1. As we have seen, the marginal return on the banker's assets is given by 1 in the absence of intervention, whether he makes loans to entrepreneurs or invests in the storage technology. Thus, the banker's decision problem can be formulated as follows:
and the debt limit
Here i t denotes the amount of resources (units of good 1) that the banker decides to invest at date t (i.e., his assets at the beginning of date t+1). When making his investment decisions, the banker takes as given the sequence of debt limits B t 1 t=0
, the marginal return on his assets 1 , and the sequence of prices f t g 1 t=0 . If t > , then the banker …nds it optimal to borrow up to his debt limit, i.e., he will choose b t = B t . Because the return paid on his notes (his cost of funds) is lower than the return on his assets, he makes a pro…t by borrowing and investing the proceeds in the storage technology. Note also that, because the return on his assets equals his rate of time preference, he is indi¤erent between immediately consuming and reinvesting the proceeds from his previous pro…ts (his retained earnings). Therefore, a solution to the banker's optimization problem is i t = t B t , which means that the banker invests all funds he has borrowed at date t but does not invest his own funds. Thus, the balance sheet of a typical banker will have no equity, only debt. In this case, the banker's consumption at date t is simply given by
We refer to the franchise value as the lifetime utility associated with a particular choice of the return on the banker's assets, the sequence of debt limits, and the sequence of prices for bank liabilities. At each date t, the franchise value is given by
Due to competition in the market for bank loans, the return on the banker's assets is the smallest possible, 1 at each date, reducing the franchise value. As we will see, the introduction of banking regulation will play a crucial role in increasing the return on the banker's assets.
Aggregate Note Holdings
Let a t denote the aggregate note holdings at date t. For any price t > , the liquidity constraint (18) is binding, in which case the value of all notes in circulation must equal the value of the aggregate production in the second market:
Note that the aggregate production depends on the total amount of capital and the e¤ort level that each seller is willing to exert to produce good 2. Combining (19) with (26), we obtain u 0 F k m t 1 ; n t = t p t+1 .
Using (22) to substitute for p t+1 , we obtain the following equilibrium condition:
This condition determines the equilibrium e¤ort decision, given the predetermined capital stock. The price of notes t in ‡uences this decision in the following way: A lower price for a bank note increases its return and, consequently, the buyer's expenditure decision, raising the relative price p t+1 and inducing each seller to exert more e¤ort.
As we have seen, the choice of the marginal entrepreneur is given by (14) . Using (24) to substitute for t+1 , we obtain the following equilibrium condition:
This condition determines the equilibrium amount of capital at date t given the e¤ort decision at date t + 1. Notice that a lower anticipated value for t+1 results in a larger amount of capital available for production at date t + 1, holding n t+1 constant.
We can use (27) and (28) to implicitly de…ne the functions m t 1 = m ( t ) and n t = n ( t ). Using these functions, we can de…ne the aggregate production of good 2 by q ( t ) = F (k ( m ( t )) ; n ( t )). Then, the aggregate note holdings as a function of the price t are given by
Equilibrium
To de…ne an equilibrium, we need to specify the sequence of debt limits B t 1 t=0
in such a way that the bankers are willing to supply the amount of notes other agents demand and are willing to fully repay their creditors. We take two steps to de…ne a sequence of debt limits satisfying these two conditions. First, for any given sequence of prices f t g 1 t=0 , we set
at each date t. This condition guarantees that each banker is willing to supply the amount of notes in (29) at the price t . Then, given this choice for the individual debt limits, we need to verify whether a particular choice for the price sequence f t g 1 t=0 implies that each banker does not want to renege on his liabilities at any date. As we have seen, a banker who reneges on his liabilities will lose his franchise, in which case he will no longer be able to issue notes. Thus, a particular price sequence f t g 
holds at each date t. As in Alvarez and Jermann (2000), these solvency constraints allow the banker to borrow as much as possible without inducing him to default on his liabilities.
The left-hand side gives the franchise value. The right-hand side gives the current payo¤ the banker gets if he decides not to invest the resources he has borrowed at date t. In this case, he can increase his current consumption by the amount a ( t ) t , but he will permanently lose his franchise at date t + 1. We can rewrite the solvency constraints above as follows:
As in Alvarez and Jermann, we want to set debt limits that are not too tight so that condition (31) will hold with equality. (27) , (28), (29), (30) , and (31) with equality at each date t, given the initial stock of capital.
Welfare Properties
Now we want to show an important property of any equilibrium allocation in the absence of intervention (even though we have not shown existence yet). If we compare equations (27) and (28) with the solution to the planner's problem, given by equations (8) and (9), we realize that setting t = at each date t 0 makes the choices of the marginal entrepreneur and the e¤ort level exactly the same as those in the planner's solution. Thus, t = for all t 0 is a necessary condition for e¢ ciency so that the optimal return on notes at each date should be given by 1 . But condition (31) implies that the banker's solvency constraint is necessarily violated in this case, so we cannot have an equilibrium with t = for all t 0.
This means that any allocation that can be implemented in the absence of intervention is necessarily not Pareto optimal. We summarize these …ndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Any equilibrium allocation in the absence of intervention in lending practices is ine¢ cient.
Why are the bankers unwilling to supply the socially e¢ cient amount of money? As we have seen, the return on the banker's assets is the same as the return to storage and the rate of time preference. Because of competition among bankers, there is no markup over the return to storage. When bankers compete for borrowers, the return that each one of them gets is lower, which in turn restricts their ability to pay a higher return on their notes. Because the return on their assets is relatively low, there exists an upper bound on the return the bankers are willing to o¤er on their liabilities without inducing them to default. Any return above this bound makes the banker prefer to default on his liabilities.
To implement the optimal return on notes, we must drive the franchise value to zero, which is clearly inconsistent with the solvency constraints.
The previous result also says that any kind of regulation that seeks to restrict competition on the liability side of banks' balance sheets, such as the interest rate cap proposed by Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000), will result in an ine¢ cient amount of private money, regardless of the kind of intervention that is carried out on the asset side. Regulation Q in the U.S. is an example of a regulatory measure aimed at restricting the return that banks are allowed to pay to their depositors. Our analysis thus predicts that these measures necessarily lead to an ine¢ cient amount of private money creation.
Existence
To show existence, we will restrict attention to stationary equilibria for which the aggregate amount of notes issued at each date is constant over time. In the Appendix, we discuss the characterization of non-stationary equilibria. In the case of stationary allocations, we have t = , m t = m , n t+1 = n, B t = B, a t = a, and R t = 1 for all t 0.
Note that we can use (27) and (28) to de…ne the choices of the marginal entrepreneur m and the e¤ort level n as a function of the price and then de…ne the aggregate note holdings a in the same way. Finally, any stationary equilibrium must also satisfy the solvency constraints (31) . In particular, a stationary solution satis…es these constraints if and only if
Because a ( ) > 0 for any > , condition (32) holds if and only if
1.
This means that the bankers are willing to supply a quantity of notes for which the return on these notes is nonpositive. In other words, in the absence of intervention in lending practices, the bankers need to charge for their liquidity services in order for it to be individually rational for them to redeem their notes at par. As we have seen, this result has a crucial implication for the welfare properties of equilibrium allocations. In particular, the nonpositive-return-on-notes property arises in the case of stationary allocations and implies that any stationary equilibrium in the absence of intervention is necessarily ine¢ cient.
The following proposition establishes existence and uniqueness for some speci…cations of preferences and technologies.
Proposition 3 Suppose that u (q) = (1 ) 1 q 1 1 , with 0 < < 1, c (n) = n, and F (k; n) = k n 1 , with 0 < < 1. Suppose also that g ( ) = 1 for all 0 1 and g ( ) = 0 otherwise. Then, there exists a unique non-autarkic stationary equilibrium for which t = 1 for all t 0.
Under these speci…cations of preferences and technologies, it is straightforward to show that the aggregate amount of notes a ( ) is strictly decreasing in . This means that the lack of intervention results in an ine¢ ciently small amount of private money, in which case the price of notes will be too high to allow society to achieve a Pareto optimal allocation.
This result suggests that we can mitigate the commitment problem only by increasing the return on the banker's assets, which can be accomplished through the creation of banking regulation.
REGULATED BANKING
We have shown that a free-banking regime fails to deliver an e¢ cient allocation. Our results have also suggested that the way to achieve e¢ ciency is by raising the return on the banking sector's assets, which will allow us to "relax" the bankers' solvency constraints.
In this section, we consider the existence of a regulatory mechanism that sets the terms of trade in the market for bank loans by means of interest rate controls. Because the entrepreneurs' types are publicly observable, the regulator can set di¤erent interest rates for di¤erent types of borrowers. Let R t ( ) denote the gross interest rate o¤ered to a typeentrepreneur, which is the interest rate that will prevail in the submarket for loans to typeentrepreneurs. So, the goal of the regulator is to …nd the minimum interest rates R t ( ) that imply a su¢ ciently high return on the bankers'assets to allow them to supply the socially e¢ cient amount of notes. We start by describing a regulatory mechanism.
A Regulatory Mechanism
Here we describe the regulatory mechanism (or just mechanism for short). The mechanism announces a return functionR t+1 (i t ) that promises to deliver i tRt+1 (i t ) units of good 1 at date t + 1 if the banker decides to invest i t units of good 1 at date t. Then, the mechanism collects all funds raised from the bankers and allocates these resources to fund entrepreneurs and to invest in the storage technology. Because of the possibility of using the storage technology, the banker's participation constraint is given bŷ
We will restrict attention to return functions of the form:
where t 0 denotes the date-t markup over the return to storage. At each date t, the mechanism chooses a portfolio that devotes the amount e 1 G m t+1 to fund entrepreneurs and invests the remaining resources in the storage technology. In this way, we can guarantee that, given the price t+1 , any entrepreneur whose project has a positive surplus will be able to get funding provided that the bankers (the suppliers of funds) have enough resources (raised from the sale of notes and their own retained earnings).
The mechanism also requires that the interest rate R t ( ) that the regulator wants to implement in each active submarket 2 [0; ] satis…es the type-entrepreneur's participation constraint:
Finally, we must have that, given the interest rates R t ( ), the announced return function
The left-hand side gives the amount of resources that the mechanism promised at date t to deliver at date t + 1, and the right-hand side gives the total repayment received at date t + 1 from the entrepreneurs who were funded at date t. Thus, condition (36) guarantees that the announced return functionR t+1 (i t ) is indeed feasible. Note that the participation constraints (33) and (35) imply that the interest rates R t ( ) can neither be too large nor too small:
for each type m t+1 .
De…nition 4 Given a sequence of prices f t g 1 t=0 , a mechanism consists of a sequence of markups f t g 1 t=0 and a sequence of interest rate functions fR t ( )g 1 t=0 satisfying (36) and (37) at each date.
The mechanism speci…es a sequence of markups and interest rates as a function of the sequence of prices f t g 1 t=0 . We can think of this mechanism as a regulated mutual fund in which all bankers invest their resources. The rules of the fund then determine the amount of resources that will be devoted to …nance entrepreneurs and to invest in the storage technology. The regulator will prohibit bankers from making loans on their own. This means that bankers can either invest in the fund or in the storage technology. The choice of a particular mechanism then determines the marginal return on each unit invested in the fund. Di¤erent choices for the interest rates R t ( ) by the regulator translate into di¤erent values for the markups t , determining the pro…tability of the fund.
Note that setting t = 0 at each date gives us the competitive solution that we have analyzed in the previous section. We now characterize equilibria for which the markup t is positive at each date so that the bankers will be able to extract some of the surplus from the entrepreneurs. As a result, the average return on the bankers'assets will be higher.
Banker' s Problem
The banker's decision problem can now be formulated as follows:
The return functionR t+1 (i t ) is given by (34) with t > 0. The banker takes the announced return functions as given when making his decisions, as well as the sequence of debt limits
and prices f t g 1 t=0 .
As before, if t > , then we have b t = B t at the optimum, so the banker …nds it optimal to borrow up to his debt limit. If the banker has enough funds at date t, then the optimal choice for i t is such that i t e 1 G m t+1 because t > 0. If the investment amount i t is lower than e 1 G m t+1
, then the return to each incremental amount invested at date t is greater than the rate of time preference. In this case, the banker would be better o¤ if he increased his investment at date t. . We will later show that this will be the case in equilibrium.
Equilibrium
To construct an equilibrium, we follow the same steps as in the previous section. We need to …nd a sequence of debt limits that guarantees that the bankers are willing to supply the amount of notes other people demand and are willing to fully repay their creditors. The banker's solvency constraints are now given by
Existence
To show existence, we will restrict attention to stationary equilibria in which the aggregate amount of notes issued at each date is constant over time. In the Appendix, we characterize non-stationary equilibria. First, consider a solution to the banker's problem when t = and B t = a ( ) at each date t 0. In this case, we have b t = a ( ) and i t = a ( ). Second, the following result guarantees that, at any given price , the bankers will be able to raise enough resources from the sale of notes to …nance all entrepreneurs whose projects have a positive surplus.
Lemma 6
For any given > , we have a
Finally, we need to …nd the set of stationary prices for which the solvency constraints hold. Given a stationary markup > 0, any price satisfying
implies that the repayment of creditors is individually rational for each banker. Here the value^ ( ; ) is de…ned bŷ
which gives the banker's revenue at each date as a function of the price and the markup .
The markup must satisfy the following condition:
Here R M ( ) gives the average return on the banking sector's loan portfolio for the case in which the mechanism is such that, for each type m ( ), the interest rate R ( ) makes the type-entrepreneur's participation constraint hold with equality. This interest rate is given by
This means that the average return 1 + on the banking sector's loan portfolio can range from the competitive return 1 to the monopolist return R M ( ), depending on the regulatory mechanism.
Indeed, given a particular choice of the interest rates fR ( )g m ( ) , the markup will be given by
Thus, given any price , a stationary mechanism consists of a stationary markup and an interest rate function fR ( )g m ( ) satisfying (42) and
for each m ( ).
One immediate consequence of the existence of a positive markup is that the average return on the banker's assets is higher than the average return he gets in the absence of intervention. Speci…cally, for any given , the banking sector's revenue exceeds the revenue obtained in the case of perfect competition by the amount e [1 G ( m ( ))].
As a consequence, the set of stationary prices satisfying the solvency constraints must be larger than the one we obtain in the case of unregulated lending because a higher return on assets essentially relaxes the solvency constraints. The following proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of a non-autarkic stationary equilibrium in the presence of regulation.
Proposition 7 Suppose that u (q) = (1 ) 1 q 1 1 , with 0 < < 1, c (n) = n, and F (k; n) = k n 1 , with 0 < < 1. Suppose also that g ( ) = 1 for all 0 1 and g ( ) = 0 otherwise. Then, there exists a unique non-autarkic stationary equilibrium for which t = for all t 0, where < 1.
With a positive markup, it is possible to have an equilibrium in which the return on notes is strictly positive. As should be expected, a positive markup raises the return on the bankers' assets, mitigating the commitment problem associated with the note-issuing privileges. Thus, there exists an equilibrium in which the price of bank liabilities is lower, and the aggregate money supply is larger than those that we have obtained in the absence of regulation.
Welfare Properties
Now we turn to the welfare implications of having a regulated banking sector. In particular, we want to know whether the regulation of lending practices will allow us to implement the optimal return on notes.
Proposition 8
If is su¢ ciently close to one, then an equilibrium with t = for all t 0 exists.
For any su¢ ciently close to the upper bound, given by the monopolist markup ( =
, it is possible to have an equilibrium in which the return on notes equals the rate of time preference. In this case, we eliminate the opportunity cost of holding money, maximizing the surplus from trade in the second market. Because any other allocation that makes at least one entrepreneur better o¤ necessarily makes a banker worse o¤, we conclude that setting t = for all t 0 is both necessary and su¢ cient for e¢ ciency.
The regulatory mechanism has a crucial impact on the welfare properties of an equilibrium allocation. In the absence of intervention, bankers compete on the asset side of their balance sheets and can only get a positive franchise value if they o¤er a su¢ ciently low return on their liabilities. We have shown how a banking authority can increase the return on the banking sector's assets by regulating lending practices, allowing bankers to increase the return paid on their liabilities and thus favoring the provision of liquidity. As we have seen, bankers are willing to supply the optimum quantity of money only if the average return on their assets is su¢ ciently close to the return that a monopolist banker would obtain.
It is important to notice that a monopolist banker would not choose an e¢ cient allocation because he would certainly not choose the price of his liabilities to be t = at each date.
We have to keep in mind that we have assumed a perfectly competitive market for bank notes, which is crucial for the e¢ ciency of the system. The fact that a monopolist would obtain a high return on his assets does not mean that he would be willing to o¤er the socially e¢ cient return on his liabilities. To obtain e¢ ciency, a monopolist banker would have to be regulated as well.
An important corollary that follows immediately is that narrow banking (a system in which banks hold in reserves 100% of the value of their liabilities) cannot provide the e¢ cient amount of private money. Indeed, narrow banking does not o¤er any means to increase the return on the banking sector's assets.
CONCLUSION
We have shown that an unregulated banking system is unable to supply an e¢ cient amount of private money. In the absence of intervention, the return on the bankers'assets will be relatively low because of competition in the market for bank loans. Thus, the bankers will be willing to o¤er to pay only a low return on their liabilities, creating a cost for their liability holders (that they are willing to bear because these liabilities provide them with a transaction service). For this reason, any equilibrium allocation in the absence of intervention is necessarily ine¢ cient.
In view of this ine¢ ciency, we have considered the possibility of regulating the banking system. In particular, we have characterized an optimal intervention. The way to induce bankers to supply an e¢ cient amount of private money is to su¢ ciently raise the return on their assets. The regulator's goal is to ensure that the bankers get some of the surplus from the borrowers. Thus, we have established a fundamental relationship between the return on the bankers'assets and their willingness to supply a socially e¢ cient amount of private money.
So far, we have left aside the role of banks as risk transformers, whereby banks undertake risky investments but issue relatively safe debt, or alternatively whereby banks'assets are information sensitive while they issue information-insensitive liabilities (an idea that dates back to Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990 , but has regained some traction recently; see Gorton, 2010) . This is clearly an important issue that will impact the optimal provision of liquidity, and we leave it for future work. Here we show the existence of a unique stationary solution to the planner's problem for some speci…cations of preferences and technologies. In particular, we assume that u (q) =
(1 ) 1 q 1 1 , with 0 < < 1, c (n) = n, and F (k; n) = k n 1 , with 0 < < 1.
We also assume that g ( ) = 1 for any 0 1 and g ( ) = 0 otherwise. In this case, conditions (10) and (11) become
respectively, where the constants and are de…ned as 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that u (q) = (1 ) 1 q 1 1 , with 0 < < 1, c (n) = n, and F (k; n) = k n 1 , with 0 < < 1. Suppose also that g ( ) = 1 for any 0 1 and g ( ) = 0 otherwise. In this case, conditions (27) and (28) become
n = e ( ) 1
respectively, where the functions e ( ) and e ( ) are given by
e 2k (1 )
,
.
Notice that d e =d > 0, whereas d e =d < 0. Also, we have that e ( ) = and e ( ) = , where and are given by (46) and (47), respectively. For any …xed > , we have that @Z e =@ < 0 for all 2 (0; 1), lim !0 Z e ( ; ) = +1, and lim !1 Z e ( ; ) = 0.
For any …xed > , we also have that @H e =@ < 0 and @ 2 H e =@ 2 < 0 for all 2 (0; 1), lim !0 H e ( ; ) = e ( ), and lim !1 H e ( ; ) = 0. Thus, for any …xed > , a unique interior solution exists. Moreover, the Implicit Function Theorem implies that d m =d > 0 and dn=d < 0.
As we have seen, condition (32) 
Q.E.D.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 6
Note that we can rewrite the expression for the aggregate note holdings as follows:
a ( ) = e F (k ( m ( )) ; n ( )) 2k m ( ) F k (k ( m ( )) ; n ( )) .
For any price > , we have e F (k ( m ( )) ; n ( )) 2k m ( ) F k (k ( m ( )) ; n ( )) > e k ( m ( )) 2k m ( )
A.4. Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose that u (q) = (1 ) 1 q 1 1 , with 0 < < 1, c (n) = n, and F (k; n) = k n 1 , with 0 < < 1. Suppose also that g ( ) = 1 for any 0 1 and g ( ) = 0 otherwise. Note that we can rewrite (39) as follows:
where a ( ) = 
A.6. Non-Stationary Equilibria
In this subsection, we consider the existence of non-stationary equilibria. Consider …rst the case of unregulated lending. Letŵ t denote the banker's discounted lifetime utility at the beginning of date t. Then, the equations de…ning the equilibrium dynamics ofŵ t and t are given byŵ t = a t 1
and t a ( t ) = ŵ t+1 ,
whereŵ t = w t a t 1 ; t 1 a t 1 . Combining these two conditions, we can de…ne an equilibrium as a sequence of prices f t g 1 t=0 satisfying t a ( t ) = a t 1 ,
given an initial condition 0 > 0. The initial price of notes must be such that it guarantees market clearing at date t = 0, given the initial stock of capital available for the production of good 2 at date t = 0.
Note that there exists at least one stationary solution: t 1 = t = 1. Suppose now that u (q) = (1 ) 1 q 1 1 , with 0 < < 1, c (n) = n, and F (k; n) = k n 1 , with 0 < < 1. Suppose also that g ( ) = 1 for any 0 1 and g ( ) = 0 otherwise. Using the Implicit Function Theorem, we …nd that
In particular, we have d t d t 1 t 1 = t =1 = a 0 (1) a 0 (1) + a (1) > 1.
If t 1 = t = 1 is the unique non-autarkic stationary solution, then we have that, for any initial value 0 > 1, the equilibrium price trajectory is strictly increasing and unbounded, so the equilibrium allocation approaches autarky as t ! 1. Along this equilibrium path, the debt limits, given by B t = a ( t ), shrink over time and converge to zero, similar to the analysis in Gu, Mattesini, Monnet, and Wright (2012) . This means that the exchange value of bank notes depreciates over time, and consumers are able to trade smaller amounts of goods in the second market.
Consider now the case of regulated lending. Suppose that R t ( ) is given by (41). In this case, the equations de…ning the equilibrium dynamics ofŵ t and t are given by (53) and w t = a t 1
Combining (53) with (55), we can de…ne an equilibrium as a sequence of prices f t g 1 t=0
given an initial condition 0 > 0. Suppose that u (q) = (1 ) 1 q 1 1 , with 0 < < 1, c (n) = n, and F (k; n) = k n 1 , with 0 < < 1. Suppose also that g ( ) = 1 for any 0 1 and g ( ) = 0 otherwise. Notice that, for su¢ ciently close to one, 
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